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Abstract
It is commonly held that if getting a contractual remedy was costless
and fully compensatory, rescission followed by restitution would not exist
as a remedy for breach of contract. This claim, we will demonstrate, is not
correct. Rescission and restitution offer more than remedial convenience.
Rational parties, we argue, would often desire a right of rescission followed
by restitution even if damages were fully compensatory and costless to
enforce. The mere presence of a threat to rescind, even if not carried out,
exerts an effect on the behavior of parties. Parties can enlist this effect to
increase the value of contracting.
Table of Contents
I. Introduction ................................................................................ 1172
II. Rationale for Limiting Rescission Rights .................................. 1174
III. An Ex Ante View of Rescission ................................................. 1176
IV. The Threat to Contractual Stability ............................................ 1181
V. The Right to Reject .................................................................... 1181
VI. Conclusion.................................................................................. 1182
† We are grateful to Victor Goldberg, Jonathan Rose, Robert E. Scott and Doug
Rendleman for comments on earlier versions of this Article. We are also indebted to
seminar audiences at USC and Columbia and the 2010 CLEF workshop held at Yale. We
thank Aileen Nielsen for excellent research assistance. Part of the research was conducted
while Alexander Stremitzer was a Visiting Assistant Professor at the Yale Law School and
the Yale Economics Department. Financial support from the Oscar M. Ruebhausen
Foundation at Yale Law School is gratefully acknowledged.
∗ Richard R.W. Brooks is the Leighton Homer Surbeck Professor of Law at the Yale
Law School.
∗∗ Alexander Stremitzer is an Acting Professor of Law at UCLA School of Law.

1171

1172

68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1171 (2011)
I. Introduction

Why provide a remedy in restitution for breach of contract? One
might imagine that a remedy in restitution only makes sense in cases where
contract remedies are inadequate, or wholly absent, such as in those
situations where there is no remedy at law due to a failure of formation or
some technical defect.1 When something prevents an agreement from
receiving adequate enforceability under contract law, restitution steps in
and cleans up the mess, as it has for centuries. But what about those cases
where contract provides a perfectly adequate remedy; what purpose—other
than perhaps expediency, or worse, mischief—is served by allowing a party
to rescind the agreement and turn to restitution as if the contract and an
adequate remedy for its breach did not exist? Notwithstanding the
transaction costs of pursuing the contract remedy, restitution here would
seem dubious or, at best, duplicative.2
We will show, however, that there is a purpose, a heretofore
unappreciated economic purpose, of rescission and restitution, which
manifests even where contract remedies are fully compensatory and
costless to enforce.3 This is not to say that the economic argument we offer
is the only or the essential function of rescission followed by restitution. In
making our argument, we are fully cognizant of the fact that the remedy of
rescission and restitution also often promotes the economy that previous
commentators emphasized. Our principal aim is not to exclude other
considerations, but rather to expand the scope of inquiry regarding
rescission and restitution. Indeed, we believe that the remedy’s long and
pervasive existence—dating back to ancient Roman markets and likely
earlier to the legal regimes of ancient Greece and Egypt—can best be
understood only by appealing to its variable functions, including the one we
identify.

1. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT §§ 31–35
(2011) (providing remedies to a party who renders performance under an agreement that is
ultimately unenforceable due to indefiniteness, lack of formality, illegality, inconsistency
with public policy, incapacity of a party, or mistake, or due to some supervening condition
or uncertainty of an obligation to perform nonetheless delivered under protest).
2. Cf. Andrew Kull, Restitution as a Remedy for Breach of Contract, 67 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1465, 1499 (1994) ("A party to a valid contract has no claim a priori to anything other
than his contractual expectancy. If the enforcement remedies were fully effective and
costless, rescission would not exist as a remedy for default.").
3. This is also the main thesis in the authors’ Article, Richard R.W. Brooks &
Alexander Stremitzer, Remedies On and Off Contract, 120 YALE L.J. 690 (2011).
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Our argument begins with the well-known proposition that when
promisors breach contracts, promisees normally prefer (legal costs aside) a
remedy in contract to rescission and recovery of price paid. Normally,
expectation damages, the conventional remedy for breach of contract, are
greater than the contract price.4 Hence, only in odd cases—cases of socalled losing contracts, where realized value of performance turns out to be
less than the price—is the option to rescind and pursue restitution
preferable to expectation damages.5 In these cases, when the promisor
breaches, the promisee gets a lucky break; the breach rescues her from the
loss by giving her a right to rescind the contract and receive the price paid.
But surely, it is commonly suggested, from an ex ante perspective, "rational
parties would not bargain" for such a right.6 Our argument departs from
this conventional wisdom.
Rational parties, we argue, would often desire a right of rescission
followed by restitution even if damages were fully compensatory and
costless to enforce.7 The mere threat that a promisee may rescind, even if
the threat is not carried out, exerts an effect on the behavior of the promisor,
encouraging her to reduce the risk of rescission by increasing the value of
performance to the promisee. Parties may enlist this implied threat to
increase the value of contracting.
To illustrate, take a seller of goods who knows that the buyer has a
right to rescind the contract if the goods are defective. Because rescission
is generally disfavored by the seller, she has incentive to reduce its
incidence. The remedy of rescission is available only if the goods delivered
are sufficiently defective (that is, the quality of the goods falls short of the
level specified or implied in the contract so much so as to constitute total
breach) or if the goods are wrongly not delivered at all.8 The seller, of
4. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 344 cmt. a (1981) (noting that
expectation damages, v, ordinarily exceed reliance damages, which include the price, p, and
any incidental reliance, r, made on the contract). Hence the familiar chain of inequalities,
that ex ante expectation is greater than reliance, which in turn is greater than restitution of
benefits conferred to breacher: v > p + r > p. Note that if the price has not been paid up
front this inequality would turn into v – p > r >0.
5. See Kull, supra note 2, at 1469 ("[R]estitution as an alternative remedy for breach
of contract becomes interesting chiefly in cases where the aggrieved party has made an
unfavorable bargain, a contract that he has been performing (or would have been obliged to
complete) at a loss.").
6. Id. at 1477.
7. Moreover, even in cases where parties would not voluntarily bargain for such a
regime, we show that the availability of rescission might still be socially desirable.
8. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 37(1) (2011).
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course, is not without some control over the quality of the goods she
produces or whether she delivers the goods at all. Indeed, by investing in
the quality of the goods, the seller can reduce the probability that the buyer
will have the legal right to rescind. Our argument derives from this basic
insight. Parties can enlist the threat of rescission to create efficient
incentives to invest in quality. They may therefore rationally desire a right
to rescission and restitution even if contract remedies are correctly and
costlessly administered.
Part II briefly reviews the traditional arguments for and against
granting rescission rights. These arguments are all grounded in distribution
and ex post transaction cost considerations. In Part III, we make the case
for efficiency and ex ante investment considerations. We argue that if
parties can elect between rescission and expectation damages, they can
tailor incentives to efficiently invest in quality. Part IV addresses the
implications of our analysis for a troubling trend in modern contract law:
There is a tendency to limit the availability of rescission, while, in cases
where it is granted, to allow for generous ensuing remedies. Our analysis
suggests that the trend should be moving in the opposite direction. In Part
V, we argue that rejection and rescission are functionally equivalent and the
ensuing remedy should be limited to restoration of price in both cases.
Again, this is the exact opposite of many modern reformers’
recommendations.
II. Rationale for Limiting Rescission Rights
Easy availability of rescission followed by restitution has been, for
centuries, a source of great anxiety among legal authorities who fear it as a
threat to commercial order and other normative values. Responding to
these fears, authorities have limited the ease with which rescission may be
elected. The arguments they allow for rescission and restitution, as an
alternative to money damages or specific performance, are typically limited
to fairness and expediency. The Restatement (Third) of Restitution &
Unjust Enrichment summarizes the point well: "Unlike the case of
rescission for fraud or mistake, the justification of rescission as an
alternative remedy for breach is not the avoidance of unjust enrichment but
a concern with fairness to the injured party combined with remedial
economy."9
9.

Id. § 54 cmt. e.
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The arguments against rescission and restitution tend to receive more
weight when contract remedies are available. Among these arguments is a
long held concern that allowing the buyer to rescind a contract can lead to
excessively harsh outcomes for the defendant. Basic fairness and morality,
often discussed in terms of unjust forfeitures for defendants or unjust gains
to strategic plaintiffs, inform much of the resistance to rescission and
restitution. Efficiency arguments enter here too. We will address two of
these arguments before presenting our own efficiency justification for
liberal rescission rights.
First, rescission may lead to inefficient returns. Just because a
promisee values goods less than the contract price for them doesn’t mean
that those goods aren’t nonetheless most efficiently allocated to her. A
tailored suit for a businesswoman may be worth less to her than the price
she agreed to pay once she observes some shortcoming in the quality or
design. Should she exercise her right of rescission and receive restitution,
the suit itself may still be best allocated to her—assuming the suit’s defect
does not prevent its fashionable wear or other use. Rescission can interfere
with goods being put to their most valued uses. Costless renegotiation, of
course, would set things back on track. Following rescission and
restitution, the promisee and promisor (the businesswoman and the tailor in
the example above) would reach a new agreement for delivery of the goods
if the former still valued them more than the opportunity costs to the latter
of delivering them. But renegotiation is not costless and, indeed, is often
prohibitively costly. So sometimes inefficient returns would stay that way.
This cost of the rescission remedy would have to be weighed against the
benefits we identified.
Second, the off-contract remedy may encourage inefficient
expenditures by some parties looking for a contractual out as well as by
other parties seeking to prevent that kind of opportunism. Andrew Kull put
the matter aptly when he observed that "[a]ny expenditure by the parties
that is directed toward facilitating or avoiding reallocation of their existing
contractual expectancies constitutes dead-weight loss."10
These
expenditures may not prevent the goods from being put to their efficient
uses (which is the first problem described above), yet they constitute a
wasteful and inefficient use of resources notwithstanding the final
allocation of the goods. To elect rescission a promisee must show a
material breach, which constrains strategic invocation of the off-contract
remedy as well as the defensive anticipatory responses to such opportunistic
10.

See Kull, supra note 2, at 1506.
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behavior. Yet, even so, there remains room for strategic behavior by the
parties, leading to wasteful expenditures. This second type of ex post
inefficiency, like the first, must be weighed against the ex ante benefits we
have identified with rescission and restitution. We have presented this
argument more formally in other settings and we reiterate its essential
structure in the next Section.11
III. An Ex Ante View of Rescission
Our argument is relatively straightforward.12 Rescission followed by
restitution is often undesirable for the seller, especially if the goods’ resale
value is low. Foreseeing the possibility of rescission by counterparties,
sellers will therefore invest to enhance the quality of performance, thereby
reducing the likelihood that the rescission right is triggered. Through its
effect on quality, the option to rescind and receive restitution may be
enlisted by parties to promote efficient contracting. The old concern about
the stability of contracting is not entirely unfounded, but the problem is not
primarily due to the ease with which parties are able to rescind following
breach; rather, it is the remedy that follows rescission. Hence, the final
point of our argument: The remedy in restitution following rescission
should be limited to restoration of price or other conferred benefits to the
promisor under the contract. We now present this argument in more detail.
A legal regime that always granted the remedy of rescission and
restitution to both parties would effectively not enforce contracts at all.
After investments are made, the distribution of surplus between the parties
becomes a zero-sum game. This implies that, whenever one party prefers to
carry out the terms of the contract over rescinding the contract and
determining the terms of trade in free renegotiations, the other party
automatically prefers the opposite. Hence, contracts would always be
rescinded and subsequently renegotiated. Anticipating renegotiation after
relationship-specific investments are sunk, the seller underinvests, as she
knows that the buyer would capture part of the surplus generated by her
investment. This is the famous hold-up problem.13
11. See Brooks & Stremitzer, supra note 3; Richard R.W. Brooks & Alexander
Stremitzer, On and Off Contract Remedies Inducing Cooperative Investments (Yale L. &
Econ. Research Paper No. 396, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract =1524327.
12. The following discussion in this section appeared in substantial part in Brooks &
Stremitzer, supra note 3, at 693, 708–10, 712–14, and is printed with permission of the Yale
Law Journal.
13. See, e.g., OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM:
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Yet, the legal right to rescind is not available when tender conforms to
the contract. A regime which allows the buyer to elect rescission only if the
right is triggered by nonconforming delivery cannot only overcome the
hold-up problem that arises if rescission rights were always available, it can
also allow contracting parties to set optimal incentives for quality
investments. Indeed, it can be shown that for every possible quality level, it
is possible to choose a price such that incentives to invest in quality are
optimal.
This claim is a strong one which is not obviously true. We formally
demonstrate its validity elsewhere.14 The basic intuition, however, is easy
to explain. Whenever, according to the background legal regime to a
particular contract, it is possible for the buyer to elect between rescission
followed by restitution and expectation damages, the seller’s payoff from
the contract depends on whether her tender exceeds the contractually
required quality level. If the tender falls short of required quality, the seller
sometimes decides not to deliver at all and pays damages for total breach of
contract. In other cases the seller decides to deliver and the buyer accepts
delivery but asks for damages for partial breach. Still in other cases the
buyer rescinds the contract and asks for restitution. However, if the tender
meets the required quality, the seller gets price minus cost. It is possible to
think of this payoff as a quality premium. The higher this premium, the
more attractive it will be for the seller to meet the quality requirement.
Typically the seller is not in perfect control of the quality level she
produces. By investing more, she can, however, increase the probability of
producing high quality. Parties recognize that, at very low prices,
investment in quality will be too small, while at very high prices,
investment in quality will be too great. Somewhere in between, however,
they can always choose an intermediate price for which incentives are just
right.
FIRMS, MARKETS, RELATIONAL CONTRACTING 61–67 (1985); Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver
D. Hart, The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration,
94 J. POL. ECON. 691 (1986); Paul A. Grout, Investment and Wages in the Absence of
Binding Contracts: A Nash Bargaining Approach, 52 ECONOMETRICA 449 (1984); Oliver
Hart & John Moore, Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation, 56 ECONOMETRICA 755
(1988); Benjamin Klein, Robert G. Crawford & Armen A. Alchian, Vertical Integration,
Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process, 21 J.L. & ECON. 297 (1978);
Oliver E. Williamson, Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual
Relations, 22 J.L. & ECON. 233 (1979).
14. See Richard R.W. Brooks & Alexander Stremitzer, On and Off Contract Remedies
Inducing Cooperative Investments (Yale L. & Econ. Research Paper No. 396, 2009),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1524327.
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It is useful to contrast this result with a background legal regime where
expectation damages are the only available remedy. Here incentives to
invest in quality are determined by the size of the damage payment to the
buyer, which is based on the contractually stipulated or implied quality
level. Investment will generally be insufficient unless the parties set the
required quality level very high. Indeed, they would have to set quality at
the highest possible level, which is why such contracts are often referred to
as Cadillac contracts.15 A real-world example of such Cadillac contracts is
the kind of contract offered by moving companies.16 Such contracts usually
promise to deliver all the client’s belongings intact. This is as valuable as
the company’s performance can be because, most of the time, the company
falls short of its promise and has to compensate its client. However, we do
not generally observe contracts that are breached so often. One might be
concerned about the transaction costs involved in assessing and haggling
about damages. Moreover, a contract that, by design, is breached almost all
of the time is at odds with the very idea of a contract as a promise. For
these reasons, and perhaps others,17 Cadillac contracts, specifying the
highest possible quality, are rarely observed in practice. This leaves us with
the conclusion that, whenever the only available remedy is expectation
damages, the seller has incentives to invest in quality, but her investment
will generally not be fully adequate to ensure the socially efficient outcome.
By adding rescission to this legal regime, parties can create optimal
investment incentives without having to stipulate unusually high quality
levels that are breached most of the time. When rescission becomes an
available option, price, in addition to quality, plays a role. With the
rescission option, there are two levers for adjusting incentives: the quality
threshold and price.18 However, it is important to keep in mind that, when
price acts as a lever to adjust incentives, it is not available as a tool to
distribute the surplus among the parties (that is the role of the price in the
case where only expectation damages were available as a remedy). To
achieve the distribution of surplus that reflects the parties’ respective
15. Brooks & Stremitzer, supra note 3, at 707; Alexander Stremitzer, Standard Breach
Remedies, Quality Thresholds, and Cooperative Investments, J.L. ECON. & ORG.
(forthcoming 2012).
16. This example is due to Aaron S. Edlin, Cadillac Contracts and Up-Front
Payments: Efficient Investment Under Expectation Damages, 12 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 98
(1996).
17. Setting abnormally high quality requirements may be perceived as unfair and may
lead to negative reciprocity on the part of producers.
18. Formally speaking, our result implies that only price is needed; for every quality
threshold there exists a price that sets efficient incentives.
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bargaining power, the parties therefore have to rely on up-front payments.
These payments are independent of what otherwise happens in the
contractual relationship. If, for example, the price required to induce
optimal investment is very low, the seller would be willing to accept the
contract only if the buyer makes an "unrefundable down payment" or pays
some money as a "flat-cost reimbursement." On the other hand, if the price
needs to be very high, the buyer will accept the contract only if he receives
some up-front payment in money or in kind from the seller. This could, for
example, consist of extra services that the seller performs free of charge.
Our result applies to a wide range of contracts. It can be put to effect
in construction contracts where, for example, the owner of a large
suspension bridge wants to incentivize the contractor to invest in innovative
dampers to reduce the vibration of the cables.19 It can be used in production
contracts, such as where a patron wants to incentivize his tailor to employ
care in designing his bespoke suit or where a car manufacturer who has
outsourced the development of a new motor wants to create incentives for
the engineering firm to invest efficiently in the motor design. The
mechanism can also be used in lease contracts by a tenant who wants to
create incentives for the landlord to invest efficiently into the maintenance
of the apartment. In principle, it can also be used in insurance contracts: A
policyholder could make the insurer invest efficiently in the quality of its
claims handling, or an insurer could make a policyholder invest efficiently
in providing accurate information about underlying risks.
Yet, the insurance contract serves to illustrate an important limitation
of our argument. First, our result relies on the fact that the rescinding party
can make its counterparty suffer in the case of rescission. This would be
the case where a policyholder has an expensive house-insurance policy on
which he has paid premiums for years, which he rescinds when the
insurance company does not honor a claim for a stolen bicycle. On the
other hand, there are some types of insurance, such as accident and life
insurance, where the payout to the policyholder if the insured event occurs
is a multiple of the sum of prior premium payments received by the
19. Remember that the parties can structure the contract in a way such that the
contractor gets a positive payoff if the dampers are able to reduce vibration below acceptable
levels but makes the contractor lose his investment if the quality of the dampers is nonconforming and therefore allows the owner to rescind. Hence, the contract employs both
carrot and sticks to achieve the desired investments in damper quality. For a case study of a
real world project in which this problem played a role, see Alterbaum et al., The Femern
Fixed Link: A Case Study in the Optimization of Construction Contracts, Yale School of
Management
Case
No.
10-040
(forthcoming
2011),
available
at
http://nexus.som.yale.edu/ffl.
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policyholder. In these cases, the threat of rescission carries no bite since
the insurer would be delighted to have the policyholder rescind and
therefore forgo his claim. The second limitation of our result is that, while
it is possible through rescission rights to create incentives to take care, this
might expose the party that is rescinded against to the risk of being harshly
punished if it turns out that it made a mistake. This would not be a problem
if the party exposed to the risk of rescission were risk-neutral. Yet take the
example of the holder of an insurance policy who faces the threat of
rescission for inadvertently having misrepresented relevant facts at the time
the insurance contract was concluded. Here, it is frequently the case that
the policyholder is not risk-neutral, as risk aversion is one of the main
motivations for purchasing insurance.20
Finally, in many situations there are already strong investment
incentives due to market pressures. A company might invest in quality just
to maintain a good reputation in the market. One might be concerned that
creating extra incentives to invest in quality through the legal system might
add to the incentives already present and at times could lead to
overinvestment. This concern, however, is unfounded, as incentives do not
add up in such an intuitive way. The reason the legal regime we describe
induces efficiency is that it makes the investing party face an expected
payoff function from the transaction, which is maximized at a socially
optimal investment level. This implies that beyond that level, the extra cost
from investing in quality exceeds the extra benefit. Therefore, if
investment levels are positive for some exogenous reason, the legal regime
only creates additional incentives to the extent they fall short of the optimal
investment level. Of course, it may be the case that exogenous factors, like
career concerns, by themselves prompt sellers to invest too much in
quality.21 In these cases, the legal regime we describe can do nothing to
reduce these excessive incentives and at the very least does not make them
worse.
20. In addition, there could be interesting cross-subsidization effects if the fact of a
nonconformity is only discovered in the unlikely case that the insured event occurs. Brian
Barnes, Note, Against Insurance Rescission, 120 YALE L.J. 328 (2010). For other motives
for purchasing insurance besides risk aversion, see Victor P. Goldberg, The Devil Made Me
Do It: The Corporate Purchase of Insurance, 5 REV. L. & ECON. 543 (2009) (arguing that
relative expertise in providing monitoring and screening services plays an important role).
21. See Bengt Holmström, Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective,
66 REV. ECON. STUD. 169, 170 (1999) (describing the likelihood of this result in situations
where a company or an employee is unknown and young and expects huge returns from
establishing a good reputation early on—not unlike the law firm summer associate described
in this text).
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IV. The Threat to Contractual Stability
Modern reformers appear to embrace the idea of restricting access to
rescission while allowing for generous ensuing remedies. We believe this
perspective has it exactly backward. The cumulative availability of
rescission and on-contract remedies, like expectation damages, threatens
contractual stability, and the restriction of rescission in appropriate cases
undermines ex ante quality investments.
The best way to see the trouble caused by cumulative concurrence—
cumulative availability of rescission and contract remedies—is to consider
the rationale of a buyer who can choose between expectation damages on
the one hand and rescission followed by expectation damages on the other.
It is obvious that the buyer cannot be worse off choosing expectation
damages and rescission over expectation damages alone. In some
instances, however, the buyer can extract rents from the seller in return for
the willingness to renegotiate rescission. In such instances, the buyer will
be better off. Hence cumulative availability of on-contract and off-contract
remedies threatens the stability of contracting much more than if rescission
and expectation damages are mutually exclusive. Moreover, cumulative
concurrence makes providing incentives for optimal investment into quality
much harder.
Therefore, if courts are concerned about stability and efficiency of
contracting as well as the potentially desirable effects of redistribution from
the seller to the buyer, they should treat rescission and expectation damages
as mutually exclusive. The buyer should not be allowed to ask for damages
beyond restitution if he has chosen to rescind. Rescission should come at a
price.
V. The Right to Reject
As a matter of law, there are of course important distinctions between
whether the goods are returned through rescission (annihilating the contract
ab initio) or through rejection (preserving the contract) followed by
recovery of price.22 These distinctions, however, do not affect the
economic character of the exchange. The goods are returned and the price
is recovered in either case. Hence, economic arguments for rescission
22. For rejection, see U.C.C. § 2-601 (2003). For rescission, which is referred to as
"revocation of acceptance" see U.C.C. § 2-608 (2003). We borrow here, from our prior
article, Brooks & Stremitzer, supra note 3, at 720.
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coming at a price also apply in cases of rejection, where it is generally
accepted that expectation damages are still available after the price has been
recovered. The inquiry here is not one regarding legal form. The question
is about the economic effect of permissively allowing parties to return
defective goods (through whatever legal device—rescission or rejection)
and recoup damages on top of price.
It sometimes seems that reformers, such as the drafters of the Uniform
Commercial Code who have made the ensuing remedy after rescission more
generous, have based their argument on a doctrinal argument by analogy.
Why, they ask, should the buyer be allowed to ask for expectation damages
after rejection but not after rescission? But the argument also cuts the other
way: If the buyer’s remedy has traditionally been restricted to restoration
of price after rescission, why should the same limitation not apply to the
remedy after rejection, especially when, as we have identified, such a
regime has very desirable welfare properties.
VI. Conclusion
We began with a simple question that heretofore seemed to have an
obvious answer. Is rescission followed by restitution a sensible remedy for
breach in a world where contract’s enforcement remedies are perfectly
compensatory and costless to bring about? The conventional answer is
"No"—"[i]f the enforcement remedies were fully effective and costless,
rescission would not exist as a remedy for default."23 We reject this
convention. The threat of rescission can encourage parties to invest in
quality and thereby increase the value of their contractual exchange. This is
something the parties would value even in the hypothetical world of fully
effective and costless enforcement, as well as in our less perfect one.
There is a purpose to rescission followed by restitution that goes
beyond remedial expediency and judicial economy. For this reason we
would encourage courts to give greater countenance to rescission, awarding
it more liberally than traditional arguments would suggest. At the same
time, however, we would advocate limiting, in this context, the ensuing
remedy in restitution. Our recommended combination of "liberal access to
rescission and a conservative ensuing remedy in restitution," is quite the
opposite of contemporary reform proposals. They would limit rescission
more generally, and yet when allowing it, they would provide for generous
23.

See Kull, supra note 2, at 1499.
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ensuing remedies. From an economic perspective, that is exactly the wrong
thing to do. No doubt, liberal access to rescission has its costs, such as
encouraging inefficient returns and opportunistic avoidance to obligations,
but its benefits should not be overlooked. These costs and benefits can be
managed somewhat through the combined approach we advocate. By
allowing greater recourse to rescission, courts can encourage efficient
cooperative investments. By restricting the ensuing restitutionary remedy,
courts can discourage the abuse of rescission.
A final point: nothing in our argument hinges on the goods being
returned through rescission, as opposed to, say, rejection. Therefore, our
efficiency perspective would recommend that the remedy following
rejection should be a return of price paid, if any—and not expectation
damages—in order to bolster cooperative investment.
Additional
considerations, legal and otherwise, of course may determine the practical
implementation of these remedies. That is as it should be. As we said at
the outset, our aim is to expand the scope of consideration of the doctrine,
not limit it.

